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Mexico has a population of 102.3 million; with only 25 percent
rural population.
1 In 2003, per capita GDP (PPP) in Mexico was
estimated at 9168 US dollars. Though this was lower than its NAFTA
partners, viz., US (37562 US $) and Canada (30677 US $), it is quite
high compared to many other developing countries.
2 Mexico also
qualifies as a country with High Human Development Index (HDI) and
Gender Development Index (GDI) estimated at 0.814 and 0.804
respectively in 2003.
3 However, the aggregate figures at national level
hide the spatial disparities in development. If we take the HDI by states
in Mexico, the most developed entity is Mexico Distrito Federal (0.93)
and the least developed ones are the southern states of Chiapas (0.53)
and Oaxaca (0.56) as per 2000 estimates (Esquivel and Lopez-Calva,
2002).
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Income inequality is highest in Mexico among the OECD
countries. The Gini coefficient of Mexico is very high and has worsened
over years from 45.1 in mid-eighties to 52.0 in mid-nineties, though it
lowered marginally to 48.0 in early 2000 (Forster M. and Mira d’Ercole,
2005).
5 Increasing internal spatial inequality is often related to greater
openness of economies and to globalisation in general,
6 and Mexico is
not an exception. 
The spatial disparities in development have further aggravated
with the entry of Mexico into the North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA) in 1993.
7  While this has led to large inflow of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and trade in services with North American nations,
there were adverse effects in terms of worsening of income distribution in
the country. The proximity to USA also catalysed the pace of migration
and given the differential access to migration among regions, income
and skill groups and gender, distorted the labour markets.
8
Along with the economic integration through NAFTA, there has
been an attempt for simultaneous establishment of democracy and
decentralisation, which marks as one of the remarkable features of New
Federalism in Mexico.
9 The federal government set up a Fiscal Pact in
1980, and with its revision in 1993, promoted decentralisation in
education and health services delivery in the early 1990s (Webb,
Stephen B and Gonzalez, Christian Y, 2004). With the advent of fiscal
decentralisation, an added emphasis is given to address the issues of
growing gender inequalities through gender responsive budgeting at
national and local levels.
10 Gender responsive budgets also provide a
logical entry point to achieve the gender commitments as outlined in
MDG and also the poverty reduction targets.
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The rationale for decentralised gender responsive budgeting is
that local governments, which are closer to citizens, have better
information on the gender differentials in needs and preferences, options
and constraints of citizens and therefore more efficient provisioning of
public services is possible at local level than at the higher levels of
government. The theoretical underpinnings of this rationale based on the
principle of subsidiarity
12 are accountability (‘voice’ and ‘exit’), information
symmetry, transparency and appropriate size of government at local
level for effective service delivery. In a congenial environment,
decentralised governance could help in better participation of all sections
of society, including women.  Most public services provided at the local5
level are ‘quasi-public’ goods, which are often ‘rival’ and ‘excludable’ to a
degree. In such cases, decentralised governments can provide these
services in accordance with the preferences of people to ensure fair
distribution of benefits. However, the beneficial effects of fiscal
decentralisation on gender sensitive human development largely depend
on the way in which the decentralisation process interacts with the social
and institutional mechanisms and systems. 
The objective of the paper is to analyse the scope and limitations
of gender responsive budgeting in Mexico within the overall framework of
fiscal decentralisation. However, decentralised gender responsive
budgeting can be meaningful only when the local governments have
significant assignment of functions and finance.  Therefore, although the
focus of the paper is gender responsiveness in decentralised budgetary
policies, the initiatives to incorporate gender concerns in federal budgets
are also analysed to capture the effectiveness of top-down approach in
conducting gender budgeting.   
Specifically, the paper attempts to: 
•  analyse the fiscal decentralisation in terms of revenue and
expenditure assignments and intergovernmental transfers in
Mexico with a gender perspective.
•  examine the federal government initiative in gender sensitive
public service delivery in health sector. 
•  evaluate the role of provincial government and civil society
organisations in the process of institutionalising gender
responsive budgeting in the State of Oaxaca; through
legislations, public policies, and budgetary process.
Data for the paper is obtained from various institutions in Mexico
including INEGI (Statistical Office), Ministry of Finance, Secretaria de
Salud (Health Secretariat), National Institute of Public Health
(Cuernavaca) and UN agencies.  The qualitative information is collated
through key informant interviews with researchers, academia, and civil
society organisations including Equidad de Género,  Fundar, National
Institute for Public Health and Oaxacan Institute for Women. A
randomised inquiry was conducted at local level with women in Oaxaca,
who belonged to lower income quintiles, to capture the perspective of
poor women in decentralised public service delivery.6
The paper has been divided into six sections. Apart from the
Introduction, section 2 attempts to assess the progress made by Mexico
in attaining the millennium development goal (MDG) against the targets
and indicators defined for the MDG for Mexico. Section 3 examines the
fiscal decentralisation process in Mexico through a gender lens; while
section 4 analyses the Federal Government’s initiative on gender
responsive budgeting in the health sector. Section 5 looks into Oaxaca’s
experience of institutionalising gender responsive budgeting through
legal fiat, where the subnational government has worked in synergy with
the civil society organisations. Section 6 concludes and draws policy
suggestions.
 II.  MDGs and Mexico
Against the backdrop of Millennium Development Goal (MDG),
there is a growing recognition that the countries that discriminate by
gender pay a high price in terms of their ability to utilise creative energies
of all sections of population for development and for reduction of poverty.
Table 1 contains MDG indicators of Mexico as of 2002. The analysis
showed that Mexico is well on its way to achieve educational attainments
in terms of universalisation of primary education as well as in gender
parity. But the capability deprivation in terms of health is acute. 7




Proportion of population below 1$(PPP) per day  (%) 9.9
Share of poorest quintile(10%) in national
consumption (%) 
1







Proportion of population below minimum level of
dietary energy consumption
5
Net enrolment ratio in primary education (%) 101
Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach
grade 5 




education Literacy rate of 15-24 year olds (% ages 15-24) 96.6
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education 1.01
Ratio of literate women to men ages 15-24 100
Share of women in wage employment in the non-








Proportion of seats held by women in national
parliaments (as % of total) 
21.2
Under five mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 29
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 24
Reduce
child
mortality Proportion of one year old children immunized
against measles (%of total )
96
Maternal mortality ratios (per 100,000 live births)  79 Improve
maternal
health
Proportion of births attended by skilled health
personnel (%) 
86
Condom use at last high risk sex (% ages 15-24) 57
Prevalence of malaria (per 100,000 people)  8
Prevalence and death rates associated with






diseases Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under
directly observed treatment, short course(DOTS) (%)
83










Carbon dioxide emission per capita (metric tons)  4.3
Proportion of population with sustainable access
to an improved sanitation, urban and rural (%)
74
Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods
and services (%) 
23.2
Unemployment rates of 15-24 year olds (as
percentage of labour force ages 15-24)
4.9
Proportion of population with access to
affordable essential drugs on a sustainable 
basis (%) 
80-94








Internet users per 1000 people 98.5
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2005
However, the analysis of MDG disaggregated to regions and
subgroups revealed stark regional disparities in terms of education and
infrastructure, as well as in poverty, with a north-south divide in the
country and indigenous groups worst off in terms of poverty, illiteracy
levels, gender equity and basic infrastructure (Ricardo Fuentes and
Andres Montes, 2004).
There are three important issues related to MDG: Firstly,
because of its critical role in development, it is important to achieve the
MDGs. Secondly, reduction of gender gap in the delivery of services is
also important. This will also help in accelerating the pace of achieving
the MDGs. Thirdly, for attaining these goals, a re-look at the assignment
system is needed to ensure that the functions are assigned according to
the comparative advantage of each level and orientation of both the
centre and local governments to ensure that they follow inclusive
development. 9
III.  Fiscal Decentralisation and
Gender Issues in Mexico 
The federation of Mexico has 32 states and 2440 municipalities;
each state has its own history, culture, and heritage.  The states vary
widely in socio-economic development and their integration with the rest
of the world. Mexico is an example of co-operative federalism in practice,
with considerable degree of policy co-ordination between federal and
State governments. Much of the intergovernmental co-ordination has




Mexico is a highly centralised federation. Although
decentralisation initiative began with the federal government transferring
social sector responsibilities to all the states in 1992, not much progress
has been made in this direction and most functions effectively remain
with the federal government.  The assignment of expenditure
responsibilities across various tiers of government is specified by law
(Table 2).  In practice, however, there is ambiguity due to considerable
overlapping. The federal and state governments have concurrent
obligations for important services, which include education, health and
social assistance. 
Table 2: Mexico’s Expenditure Assignment
Expenditure function Federal government State governments Municipal
governments
Defence •  100 percent
Foreign Affairs and
Economic Relations
•  100 percent
Labour Policies •  100 percent
Monetary and
Financial Policy
•  100 percent
Post and
Telecommunications
•  Government and
private providers10
Table 2: Mexico’s Expenditure Assignment (contd.)
Expenditure function Federal government State governments Municipal
governments





















•  All education in
the Federal
District












•  High schools and
state universities
•  Administration of
programmes and
self-evaluation














Table 2: Mexico’s Expenditure Assignment (contd.)
Expenditure function Federal government State governments Municipal
governments











•  Secondary and
tertiary hospitals
•  Labor relations
and wage
determination
•  Most capital
infrastructure
decisions  

































•  Local streets
Police and Internal
Security




•  Federal and
border police 





•  Special police
(concurrent)
•  State public
order and safety
•  Local public
order and
safety12
Table 2: Mexico’s Expenditure Assignment (contd.)




























•  National parks
(concurrent)
•  National parks
(concurrent)
•  Local parks
Public
Transportation













•  National standards




and the Ministry of
Industry





•  Land use
permits13
Table 2: Mexico’s Expenditure Assignment (contd.)

























•  Some states
have housing
agencies


























•  Some research
Other Infrastructure Financing through
Ramo 33 “ social
infrastructure” for
the poor








Table 2: Mexico’s Expenditure Assignment (contd.)
Expenditure function Federal government State governments Municipal
governments







Industrial Policy •  Concurrent •  Concurrent • 
Source: Giugale, Marcelo and Webb, Steve (2000) and Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto; Gonzalez,
Jose Antionio and Rojas, Fernando, 2002.
In general, the federal government provides those public
services whose benefit reaches the entire nation, such as national
defence, foreign affairs, monetary and fiscal policies, telecommunication
(along with private providers), national highways, and labour policies.
State governments provide services such as construction and
maintenance of state feeder roads and primary care for the rural
population and urban poor, State public order and safety, food
assistance to poor, implementation of school-lunch programmes, water
supply and sewage (concurrent with municipal governments) with an
intermediate benefit sphere.  Municipal governments provide services
with local benefit areas, viz., street lighting, sanitation, slaughter homes
and public markets, and land use permits. 
2.3  Fiscal Transfers
Mexican federation is characterised by heavy subnational
dependence on federal transfers to bridge the gap between significant
subnational expenditure assignments and abysmally low and inadequate
subnational tax capacity. In other words, there is a high dependency of
State and Municipal governments on the intergovernmental fiscal
transfers in Mexico. 
The two main categories of transfers in Mexico are unconditional
participaciones (Ramo 28) and conditional aportaciones (Ramo 33). In
2004, participaciones (Ramo 28) constituted 39.70 percent of total fiscal
transfers, while aportaciones  (Ramo 33) constituted 45.70 percent of
total transfers (Table 3). It is noted that both these transfers accounted
for approximately 40 percent of the federal budget (INEGI, 2004). 15
Participaciones is unconditional fiscal transfers. Most of these
transfers go out under Ramo 28. These transfers were originally
revenues of states and municipalities. But the collection of these
revenues was delegated to the federal level in the Fiscal Pact for tax
efficiency reasons. Legally, the federation only collects those taxes and
distributes the proceedings to states.
14 
Table 3: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico: 2002-2004 (%)
           Structure of Transfers
2002 2003 2004
Participaciones(Ramo28) 42.7 41.3 39.7
Aportaciones (Ramo 33) 48.0 47.2 45.7
FAEB 31.1 30.7 29.7
FASS 5.5 5.8 5.7
FAIS 4.3 4.1 3.9
FASP 0.6 0.5 0.6
FAM 1.4 1.3 1.3
FAFM 4.4 4.2 4.0
FAETA  0.6 0.6 0.5




SEP 4.9 4.6 5.1







Note: Figure in the bracket relates to total fiscal transfers in millions of pesos. 
Source:  Direccion General de Estadistica de la Hacienda Publica, Unidad de
Planeacion Economica de la Hacienda Publica in Estadisticas Opportunist de
Finanzas Publicas y Deuda Publica.
Aportaciones  are conditional fiscal transfers. These transfers,
formerly under Ramo 26, now go out under Ramo 33. Ramo 33 transfers
originated from a complex amalgam of fund programmes like FAEB
(education), FASS (health), FAIS (social infrastructure), FASP (public
safety), FAM (public assistance transfers), FAFM (transfers to
municipalities) and FAETA (public education). These transfers were
conceived as federal money earmarked to pay for (formerly) federal
commitments and transferred to the state and municipalities together16
with those commitments, for example, most important being education
and health. 
Chart 1: Structure of Aportaciones, 2004
FAEB transfers, related to education, is single largest component
of Ramo 33. It is seen that 65 percent of Aportaciones went for FAEB
(for education) and 12 percent for FASS (for health) (Chart 1). It is to be
noted that most of the Ramo 33 transfers do not relate directly to poverty
alleviation and social infrastructure, but rather to the payroll of
functionaries, which were decentralised to the states through an
agreement reached in 1993. 















Fiscal federalism in Mexico, like elsewhere, is faced with
asymmetries in spending and revenue assignments. Almost 95 percent
of the revenue raised and 94 percent of expenditure incurred is at federal
and provincial levels.









Federal 811431 76.5 875775 65.6
Provincial 192578 18.1 382638 28.7
Municipal 57525 5.4 76569 5.7
Total 1061534 100 1334982 100
Source: Government Finance Statistics, 2003, International Monetary Fund
In other words, local revenues and expenditures constitute just
about 5 percent of total revenue and 6 percent of local expenditures. In
2002, the relative shares of federal, state and municipal governments in
total expenditures respectively were 65.6, 28.7 and 5.7 percent (Table
4).  
3.4 Gender in Fiscal Decentralisation
Given the asymmetries in spending and revenue assignments
across the three tiers of government in Mexico, gender responsive
budgeting needs to begin at the federal and to some extent at provincial
levels.  At the same time, the medium and long term strategy should be
to devolve more powers to local governments and sensitise them to
gender equity concerns. 
There is no evidence of incorporating gender in the
intergovernmental relations in Mexico. One of the potential areas is
incorporating gender in the criteria for fiscal transfers. The conditional
transfers on education and health under Ramo 33 are designed on the
basis of staffing and physical sites (schools, clinics, and hospitals).
These transfers could be made more equitable and efficient, if it is
designed with criteria related to population density, age, and gender
across provinces in Mexico (Giugale, Marcelo and Webb Steve, 2000).18
The point to be noted here is that it would be ideal to incorporate
gender in specific purpose transfers (conditional) rather than in general
purpose transfers (unconditional). The objective of the general purpose
transfer system is to offset the fiscal disabilities and it is desirable to
keep the transfer system formula-based, simple, equitable, and without
perverse incentives. Any attempt to bring in the gender component in
general purpose transfers may make it complex and can create
incentives against undertaking measures to improve gender equity.
However, equalisation transfers will enhance gender equity.
Equalisation transfers improve the capacity of the poorer regions
to deliver standards of social and economic services. These transfers are
not specifically targeted to the poor; but the poor will benefit from the
general capacity increase in the region. The condition of women is
expected to be worse in poorer regions and states. Equalising transfers
may help to provide larger outlay for programmes and policies with larger
content for women’s empowerment. But there exist no fiscal equalisation
transfers in Mexico.
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IV. Federal Government Initiative in
Gender Sensitive Public Service
Delivery: 
The Case of the Health Sector
The Federal government has taken considerable initiatives in
terms of gender budgeting in the health sector in Mexico. This section
deals with the initiatives taken to sensitise budgetary decisions for
gender concerns in the provision of health services in terms of scope and
its limitations.
 
The health system in Mexico is fragmented. It has several
subsystems, each servicing different population groups. First, there are
several social security schemes, the largest being the Mexican Institute
of Social Security (IMSS), which covers the employees and the self-
employed in the formal sector of the economy.
16 Second, the services
provided by the Department of Health (Secretaria de Salud or SSA) and
the state governments to the uninsured population (or poblacion
abierta).
17  Third, some urban middle and upper income level population19
may contribute to social security but also seek health care in the private
sector, either through out-of-pocket payments or through pre-paid private
medical insurance schemes. 
4.1 Financing Health in Mexico
In Mexico, the sources of financing health in the public sector
include Federal Ministry of Health (Sector Salud), the Provincial
Ministries of Health, and Social Security Institutions like IMSS, ISSSTE
and PEMEX.  In the private sector, financing sources include households
and employers (companies) who pay insurance premiums for their
employees. The point to be noted here is that information on total
financing of health sector has not been compiled in Mexico till recently.
Mexico’s ‘National Health Programme 2001-2006’ took up the challenge
of institutionalising a System of National and State Health Accounts
broadly in line with International Classification of Health Accounts. The
aim of this attempt is to produce information on financial resources spent
on health, the flow of funds within the institutions of the health sector and
enhance the accountability.
The Mexican Health Foundation (Funsalud) carried out the first
estimates of health expenditure using the System of National Health
Accounts  (SNHA).  Chart 2 gives health expenditure by financing
sources for the year 2003.20
Chart 2: Health Expenditure by Sources of Finance, Mexico 2003
Source: Health Secretariat, Mexico
The most relevant finding of the SNHA is that private sector is
the main financing source for medical services and private out-of-pocket
expenditure in Mexico accounted for 51 percent of total health
expenditure.  This finding has gender implications, especially in the
context of the fact that only 51 percent of the population is covered under
social security schemes.  Secondly, government spending constitutes
just about 15 percent of total spending.  Of this, the provincial spending
is just 2.5 percentage points.  In other words, the direct spending by the
government on the health sector is very low and of this the share of state
governments is abysmal as over 84 percent of government spending is

































4.2  Decentralisation in Health Sector
The recent process of decentralisation in the health sector in
Mexico began with the adoption of the Program to Reform the Health
Sector, 1995-2000. The Program aimed not only at the decentralisation
of health towards the states, but also to increase the coverage of the
non-insured population. It also sought to address inequalities in access
to health care and the low quality and inefficiency of health services in
the federal-state system administered by the Ministry of Health
(Mendoza, Enrique Caberero and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, 2000). 
Until 1990s, the decentralisation process was slow and could
possibly be characterised as administrative deconcentration.  During the
period 1983-1987, some responsibilities for health services previously
under the federal government were transferred to states, but in only 14
states. However, these states continued to be subject to strict regulatory
and budgetary controls by the central Ministry of Health. Its
implementation was characterised by a high level of conflict between the
traditional players of Mexican health system: namely, the players
connected to social security (mainly from Mexican Institute of Social
Security, IMSS) and the Minister/ Ministry of Health (SSA – Secretaria de
Salud) (Saddi, Fabiana, 2004). The current decentralisation of the
federal-state health care system is deeper and wider than that of the
1980s. 
The fiscal transfers to health sector have been less adhoc and
less arbitrary in its design in this new phase of decentralisation. The
devolution of Resources Fund for Health Services (FASS) from
Secretaria de Salud to the States, which began in 1996, is determined on
the basis of formula. The criteria for devolution of health transfers is
given in Article 29, 30, and 31 of Fiscal Co-ordination Act. As per Article
29, the fiscal transfer for health sector is based on three criteria as
follows: (a) inventory of infrastructure, hospitals, and personnel; (b)
actual expenditure required to pay to the personnel; and (c) other
resources allocated within the federal budget document, in order to
promote equity in health services. 
With regard to functional assignments in health sector in Mexico,
Federal government retained the regulatory powers, responsibilities
related to major specialised hospitals, research and training. State22
governments are given the assignments related to state level hospitals,
clinics, health centres, public health system, sanitation, monitoring of
rabies and dengue fever, supervision of water quality and pollution
control; while the government at county-levels are vested with no powers
other than confined participation in water and sanitation programmes.
Given the skewed assignments in the functions and finances of the
health sector, it is significant to adopt a top-down approach towards
gender responsive budgeting.
4.3  Gender in Health Sector of Mexico
In the backdrop of National Development Plan (2000-2006), the
process of gender responsive budgeting in health sector began in
Mexico at the federal level. The two components in the process of
making gender responsive budgeting in health sector are (i)
mainstreaming gender in health policy; and (ii) reprioritising budgetary
allocation to reduce gender gaps. 
No models existed on the ex-ante process of gender responsive
budgeting in Mexico. A guide was prepared by Equidad de Género to
incorporate gender in health policy and budgeting. This guide is primarily
to build the capacity of government officials who are involved in the
preparation of health budget. Subsequently, a three-day forum on
Women and Health Programme was held in 2001 in Mexico, officially
endorsed by the Department of Health, to generate proposals to be fed
into the development of the six-year sectoral programme of the health
department. The forum discussed a plethora of health issues concerned
with the complete life cycle of women. As a result of the three-day forum,
a technical committee was created within the Women and Health
Programme, comprising a diversity of actors in order to contribute to the
aim of integrating gender into all the activities of the Health Department.
Further, gender-sensitive budget group was established. It was vide this
process that gender-sensitive budgets reached the policy agenda and
achieved a formal endorsement (Box 1). 23
Box 1 Process of Gender Budgeting in Heath Sector of Mexico
Step 1: Theoretical Procedure Narrated by ‘Health Guide’ To Conduct Gender
Budgeting
a)  proper diagnosis of health sector from gender perspective.
b)  Analyse gender equities and periodic review of the programmes.
c)  Analyse components and actions of the programme to understand where
gender budgeting can be introduced to reduce the gender gaps through
reallocation.
d)  Define priorities and track any reappropriation of the money allocated. 
e)  Design indicators to measure whether gender gaps are reduced.
Step 2: Agenda of ‘Women and Health’ Forum To Operationalise Gender
Budgeting
a)  Gender perspective in health programmes.
b)  Sectoral gender budgeting.
c)  Regulations bearing on health needed to be updated/changed/newly
created.
d)  Programming with gender perspective; evaluation of plans and
programmes from gender perspective. 
e)  Health officials’ gender training, especially on reproductive health, human
rights and prevention of domestic violence (mental health component).
Step 3: Programme of Action To Implement Gender Budgeting  
a)  Institutionalisation of gender perspective in health budgets.
b)  Sensitising the health officials in gender and identifying gaps.
c)  Measure gender gaps (homicide, women’s health, mental health, eating
disorders, diabetics, access to health, adhere to diet, domestic violence).
d)  Collection of data/information to document gender-gaps and show gender
inequities (mortality statistics, epidemiology surveillance statistics,
hospitalisation data by gender, morbidity statistics by gender, primary
care level statistics). 
e)  Appointing women as ‘health workers’ in formal sector.
f)  Changing social perception of health. 
g)  Community participation in health policy decision-making, recognising the
existence of free labour force, usually women, in the care economy. 
Source: (Interviews), Secretaria de Salud
The strength of gender budgeting attempts in the health sector of
Mexico is the ex-ante process of diagnosing the gender differentials in
health, prior to programming and budgeting to reduce the gender gaps.24
This is an advanced step in gender budgeting; moving beyond the
traditional models of ex-post gender budgeting which is confined to the
quantification of gender related allocations in the existing health
budget.
18 
Yet another point to be noted is that as public financing of health
is only 15.4 percent of the total (with 12.9 percent at centre and 2.5
percent at provincial levels), the emphasis of gender budgeting initiatives
confined to Secretaria de Salud might not result in intended results.
Given the significant magnitude of out-of-pocket expenditure on health,
gender budgeting initiatives in health sector need to be extended to
private financing aspects of the health sector and in turn identify the
policy alternatives for the health coverage of non-insured poor
households. The expenditure tracking surveys of significant programmes
like  Progressa can also be useful in analysing the gender differential
impacts of public expenditure in terms of health.
The evidence from Time Use Survey (TUS) of Mexico could
provide useful insights to identify appropriate health policy initiatives for
women. For instance, TUS (2001) revealed that men spent 2.4 hours per
week for health care compared to women at 3.9 hours per week. This is
relatively higher than the time allocation by women in fetching of water
and fuel (1.4 hours per week).  This empirical evidence from TUS
suggests that the issues of women not only as users of services, but also
providers of health services, both at community level and household
level, need adequate attention in the macropolicies related to health
sector.
V. Oaxaca’s Experience: The Role of
State Government in Gender Responsive
Budgeting
Oaxaca is one of the southern states in Mexico with worse
welfare indicators, where indigenous communities fare even worse; in
particular, indigenous women, are largely monolingual (speaking only
their indigenous language) and have exceptionally low levels of
education, and are commonly confined to their villages (Cos-Montiel,
2003). The maternal mortality rate (MMR) is very high in Oaxaca. In25
2003, MMR was as high as 103.1 per one thousand live births in
Oaxaca. It is higher than the national average (63.9). The trends in Infant
Mortality Rate (IMR) also showed that it is higher in Oaxaca (25.6 per
one thousand live births) than at the national average (19.7 per one
thousand live births). 
In addition to the quantitative indicators, it is important to analyse
the qualitative aspects as well. It is noted that, in some communities,
cultural traditions impose very rigid roles and responsibilities both on
men and women. The geography of Oaxaca is yet another factor that
exacerbates the inequalities created by gender roles for two reasons
(Cos-Montiel, 2003). Firstly, in Oaxaca, provision of public services and
infrastructure is far fetched, especially by poor remote communities,
which are often indigenous. The absence of quality services leads to a
continuation of traditional practices, which may reinforce inequalities
between men and women and stunt the development of those living in
remote communities, thereby impeding economic development and well
being. Secondly, influences that can alter gender roles are slow to reach
remote areas, therefore changes occur more slowly than in more urban
or accessible communities.
The following two subsections analyse the process of gender
budgeting in Oaxaca through legal fiat and also the attempts to address
the gender concerns on the revenue side of the budget. However, it is
too early to analyse the impact of gender budgeting in Oaxaca on gender
development, as it was initiated only in 2002-2003. 
5.1 Institutionalising Gender Budgeting through Law: Scope and
Limitations
The Oaxacan experience of local level gender budgeting is an
example to decipher the limitations of legislative fiat-based budgetary
reforms in its impact on public service delivery. It also throws light on the
scope and limitations of the attempts of civil society organisations in
institutionalising gender budgeting. The Institute of Oaxacan Women
(IOW) played the crucial role in institutionalising gender budgeting in the
state of Oaxaca. First of all, IOW sensitised government officials on the
significance of gender budgeting in the context of the prevailing gender
inequalities through rigorous gender sensitive training. Secondly, they
persuaded the Governor to pass a law to make compulsory to generate
sex disaggregated data and indicators, further disaggregated by ethnic26
components and rural-urban differentials. The creation of the system of
gender disaggregated information was given emphasis as an important
prelude to gender responsive budgeting.
The process of gender budgeting, as mentioned, began in most
of the developed and developing countries through an ex-post analysis
of the budget through the gender lens. In Oaxaca, instead of analysing
the existing budgets, prima facie they assumed that the budget is gender
blind. The gender training of the officials in charge of formulating the
budgets was the first step, so they could create a methodology to
incorporate gender analysis. Each level of administration required a
different process of training with different goals. The first was aimed to
‘sensitise’ the Governor of Oaxaca to understand the importance of
gender in budgeting, second to create awareness about gender sensitive
budgeting at the top level of bureaucracy and third, to provide proper
training to the officials involved in the budget wing. The logic behind the
intervention was that, once trained, policymakers in charge of designing
policy, would succeed in identifying barriers in formulating gender
sensitive budgets.
Gender training was imparted to 17 governmental bodies and
Ombudsman by 2003. As a result, necessary amendments in the
existing legislation were made to make the process of Gender
Responsive Budgeting (GRB) mandatory. In December 2002, the local
Congress passed an Act that instructs the government to engender its
fiscal policy establishing a new benchmark for Mexico. Oaxaca thus was
the first state to integrate gender responsive budgeting process in
Mexico. However, the point to be noted here is that legal changes are
only the necessary, but not the sufficient condition for successful
integration of gender in local level budgeting. 
Effective fiscal decentralisation is an important prerequisite for
successful local level gender responsive budgeting. Although the state
government has taken significant initiative to incorporate gender in
budgeting through legal fiat, given the fiscal dependency of Oaxaca on
federal government, the scope of local level gender budgeting depends
much on the flexibility of the finances at the local level. The fiscal
dependency of Oaxaca is evidenced by the proportion of the federal
transfers in total ingressos (revenue) of the state; Participaciones
Federales (unconditional transfers) constituted 25 percent of the total27
ingressos, while Aportaciones (conditional transfers) constituted 71
percent (Table 5). 
Table 5: Structure of Revenue in Oaxaca, 2002 (in percent)





Contributions of de Majoras 0.27
Participaciones Federales (unconditional transfers) 24.86
Aportaciones Federales(conditional transfers) 70.73
Ortos Ingresos (other revenue) 0.36
Por Cuenta De Tremors 0.00
Financiamiento 0.62
Disponibilidad Inicial 0.00
Total de ingressos (total revenue) 100
Source: INEGI (2004): Finanzes Publicas Estatales y Municipales de Mexico
On the other hand, expenditure side of analysis showed that
55.77 percent of expenditure is on subsidies and transfer payments, 8.63
percent is spent on personal services and 20.55 percent is Recursos
Federales Municipios (Table 6).
Given that a significant part of the revenue of Oaxaca is for
intergovernmental transfers and most of the expenditure of the state is of
committed nature, the critical issue is to what extent the gender
responsive budgeting at the state level can impact on overall gender
equity.
Table 6: Economic Classification of Expenditure in Oaxaca, 2002
 (in percent)
Components of Expenditure (%)
Servicios Personales (Personal services) 8.63
Materiales Y Suministros (materials) 1.04
Servicios Generales(General Services) 2.38
Subsidios,Transferancias Y Ayudas (subsidies and other
transfers)
55.7728
Adquiscion Bienes Muebles E Inmuebles 0.69
Obras Publicas Y Acciones Sociales 10.60
Inversion Financiera 0.00
Recursos Federales Y EST.A Municipios 20.55
Otros Egresos (other expenditure) 0.00
Por Cuenta De Terceros 0.00
Deuda Publica 0.31
Disponibilidad Final 0.03
Total De Egresos (Total expenditure) 100
Source: INEGI (2004): Finanzes Publicas Estatales y Municipales de Mexico
5.2  Revenue side Gender Responsive Budgeting in Oaxaca
A novel feature of gender budgeting in Mexico was also the
attempt to address gender concerns on the revenue side of the budget.
In February 2003, the Ministry of Finance in Oaxaca had begun the
analysis of revenue side of the budget through a gender lens.  This
endeavour began with the objective of institutionalising a system for
identifying how men and women contribute to the fiscal system and
thereby recognising the importance of women in the tax system. The
Ministry of Finance presented a detailed strategy for incorporating
gender in revenue side of the budget in June, 2003 at a meeting
conducted by IOW, UNIFEM, and the Economic Commission for Latin
America, and the Caribbean. It is to be noted that only local direct tax
payments made by men and women were given emphasis in the
exercise. However, this initiative enabled Oaxaca to become the first
state in Mexico, and moreover in Latin America, to focus on the revenue
side in an attempt to sensitise the budget to gender issues.
As part of the endeavour of integrating gender in taxation, tax
forms, tax statements, information systems, reports on tax payments,
feedback forms, and reporting were modified to incorporate gender. The
process began with the introduction of the procedure that all tax forms
should indicate the sex of the taxpayer.  This in turn enabled them to
create databases to identify the tax and tax evaders by gender and to
generate information on investors by gender and in which areas they
invested.  Effectively, Oaxaca introduced the changed format in 2004
and the analysis of 2004 data is under progress.
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The initial analysis showed that women’s tax payments account
for 34 percent of total revenue and this information helps to make visible
the women’s invaluable contribution to development. Despite the fact
that this proportion is lower than that of men, it is important to highlight
that in Oaxaca women’s income represents only a 60 percent of those
earned by men (Cos Montiel, 2003). It is also noted by Ministry of
Finance (Oaxaca) that taxes from women reach the Revenue Service
punctually.
 
The point to be noted here is that the federal transfers constitute
96 percent of the total revenue of Oaxaca and tax collection is mainly
done by the Central government. Under this context, it is significant for
the Federal Ministry of Finance also to be equally involved in the process
of revenue-side gender responsive budgeting to make the Oaxacan
experience a success. Moreover, the initiative in Oaxaca is confined to
only direct taxes, and women tax payers constitute a negligible part of it. 
5.3 Perspective of Random Poor Women in Oaxaca on the
Provision of Public Good: A Qualitative Analysis
Oaxaca is a state where a significant part of income accrues as
remittances from abroad, particularly USA. The objective function of the
household (of the women randomly selected for our analysis of
perspective of poor in the provision of public good) was to tap the
potential of unskilled labour markets in USA to improve their standard of
living. Migration aspects were the prime inference we received from this
random observation of the women of lower quintile of income class. Girls
and boys of the households only aspire to attain secondary education
level, which is the minimum threshold to aspire for unskilled labour
markets in USA. The gender-wise disaggregation of migration of
unskilled labour markets in USA from the state of Oaxaca was difficult to
obtain, but a significant number of poor women also migrate to USA. 
The capability deprivation in terms of education was not visible
from the micro response. This observation in terms of education is in
concomitant with the macro level observations that Mexico is in the path
of universalisation of education and in attaining gender equality in
education. But the situation seems different in terms of health; there is
capability deprivation in terms of health. The perspective of poor women
regarding the provision of public services in the health sector gave a
dismal picture of the functioning of primary health centres with practically30
no doctors and little medicines. In addition to health-related reasons,
they also provided insights into the non-health factors that result in poor
health indicators. One of the prime reasons behind the relatively high
maternal mortality rate among the poor women in the Oaxacan village is
lack of road infrastructure in the villages. Yet another point to be noted
here is the difficult geographic terrain of Oaxaca, where indigenous
people live in the interior mountain villages and public provision of goods
is yet to reach. The access and utilisation pattern of health services were
discussed with the random poor women of our study, which revealed the
existence of significant number of private (indigenous medical
practitioners) in the village and the female members of their household
prefer to take treatment from them rather than going to public health
centres. No disease specific pattern in accessing the public versus
private health care clearly came out of the discussion; the only matter
which was revealed was the superstitious belief in the occultist of the
village in deciding whether to access health care, especially among
women.  
The time use aspects were discussed with the women, randomly
chosen, to understand the statistical invisibility of women’s work. It was
revealed that they spent equal hours in care economy and market
economy (pottery and piggery) and evidence of multi-tasking was also
reported. They reported that the forward and backward linkages of
economic activity, they involve with, is very weak in village, though they
did not report significant market failures for the products.  
The incidence of domestic violence was discussed with the
women; but they reported no evidence of domestic violence in Oaxacan
village. This information needs to be viewed within the realm of self-
censorship threshold. It is also to be noted that apparently financial and
functional autonomy was evident for the female members of the
household as they have to undertake the household responsibilities in
the absence of their men who migrated to the unskilled labour markets in
USA. 
VI.  Conclusion
The overall conclusion of the study is that despite considerable
initiative to make the local budgeting gender responsive, much remains31
to be done.  The strategy to impart gender responsiveness to budgeting
lies in hastening the fiscal decentralisation process itself.  Given that
more than ninety percent of the subnational government revenue
accrues from fiscal transfers and subnational governments hardly have
fiscal autonomy in expenditure decisions, the attempt of gender
budgeting at local level in Mexico does not go far enough. Undoubtedly,
the initiatives in terms of creating a legal framework and carrying out the
necessary amendments taken are noteworthy and the civil society
groups, particularly women’s groups have played important role in
furthering advocacy; however the effectiveness of these measures
depend on the role of the state governments in providing public services.
Therefore, until the institutional mechanisms of fiscal decentralisation
and degree of fiscal autonomy are varied, it will be a difficult task to take
it forward. 35
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Endnotes
                                                          
1 Data relates to 2000. World Development Indicators, 2005, World Bank.
2 UNDP, Human Development Report, 2005.
3 The Human Development Index [HDI] is a gender-neutral measure of the
average achievements of a country in three basic dimensions of human
development: longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Longevity is
measured by life expectancy at birth, knowledge by adult literacy and the
combined gross primary, secondary, and tertiary enrolment ratio, and standard of
living by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in US dollars in purchasing
power parity (PPP) terms. Let L denote life expectancy at birth in years, A adult
literacy as percent, E combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment
ratio in percent, and Y per capita GDP in PPP US dollar terms.  The value of
each variable for a country is transformed into its deviation from the minimum
possible value of the variable expressed as a proportion of the maximum
deviation possible, i.e. maximum less minimum.   Thus, after transformation we
have L
* = (L-25)/(85-25),  A
* = A/100, E
*
 =E/100, and Y
*= (Y – min Y)(max Y –
min Y). Given the minimum life expectancy for women and men of 27.5 years
and 22.5 years, respectively, the average minimum life expectancy is taken as 25
[= (27.5 + 22.5)/2].  Similarly, maximum life expectancy is taken as 85.  The
maximum and minimum of both adult literacy and enrolment are taken as 100
and 0, respectively.  The maximum and minimum for Y are exogenously fixed.
HDI is computed as {L
*  + (2/3 x A
* + 1/3 x E
*) + Y
*}/3. The Gender Development
Index  (GDI) uses the same variables as HDI, but adjusts for the degree of
disparity in achievement across genders.  The average value of each of the
component variables is substituted by  “equally distributed equivalent
achievements”.  The equally distributed equivalent achievement for a variable is
taken as that level of achievement that if attained equally by women and men
would be judged to be exactly as valuable socially as the actually observed
disparate achievements.   Taking an additively separable, symmetric and
constant elasticity marginal valuation function with elasticity 2, the equally
distributed equivalent achievement Xede for any variable X turns out to be Xede  =
[ nf  (1/Xf ) + nm (1/Xm)]
-1. where Xf and Xm are the values of the variable for
females and males, and nf  and nm are the  population shares of females and
males. Xede is a ‘gender-equity-sensitive indicator’ (GESI). Thus, for this chosen
value of 2 for the constant elasticity marginal valuation function, GDI is computed
as
{Lede  + (2/3 x Aede + 1/3 x Eede) + Yede}/3.
4 GDI across states in Mexico is not readily available. The available data showed
that the least developed region is San Simón Zahuatlán in Oaxaca with a GDI of
0.5 (IOW database, 2000).
5 40 percent of population in Mexico live below poverty line (2003 estimates) and
percentage of total income earned by the richest 20 percent of population is 57.4
percent while percentage of total income earned by the poorest 20 percent is33
                                                                                                                                 
only 3.5 percent (Development Data Group, World Development Indicators,
2002).
6 For details, refer Kanbur, Ravi and Anthony Venables (2005).
7 The process of trade opening has begun in 1987 with inclusion of Mexico in the
GATT; and NAFTA in 1993 strengthened the process.
8 In 1990, almost 4.4 million Mexicans resided outside the country (almost all in
the United States), roughly double the estimated number in 1980, with new
important sources of emigration included the Provinces of Chihuahua and
Oaxaca and the Federal District.
9 The transition to democracy occured with the presidential elections of 2000,
which ended the dominance of a single party in Mexico for over 70 years. The
establishment of democracy and decentralisation has roots in the social and
politically historical facts; that in reality is the foundation of Mexican democracy
and the end of one-party hegemony. Though the first efforts of decentralisation
date to the 1980s; the decentralisation of mid 1990s led the way for institutional
reforms with respect to raising revenue sharing allocations to the states,
expansion of state’s capacity to raise own resources, allocation to the states of
the major share of funds assigned for regional and social development,
strengthening the capacity of municipalities and clarification of administrative
functions among federal, state and local authorities (Ward, Peter M, et.al., 1999).
10 The effect of fiscal decentralisation and gender budgeting in lessening the
spatial and gender disparities created by NAFTA is an empirical question which
is too early to analyse in the context of Mexico; and beyond the scope of the
paper.
11 It is important to note that the Mexican experience of gender budgeting
subscribes more to the Cairo and Beijing Platforms of Action than MDG
framework.
12 Oates, 1972.
13 For details, refer Giugale, Marcelo and Steve Webb (2000)
14In other words, Participaciones come from the most important sources of
revenues. The main components of these assignable taxes are revenues
collected from the federal income tax, the value added tax and the ordinary fees
from oil. These federal transfers to the states and municipalities under Ramo 28
are aimed to strengthen their revenue capacity, compared with their expenditure
mandates.
15 The basic argument for such equalising transfers is found in the rationale of
horizontal equity advanced by Buchanan (1950) and later reformulated by
Boadway and Flatters (1982). A quick econometric investigation has been carried
out to examine whether the principles of fiscal equalisation operate in Mexico.
Using fixed effects model of pooled least squares across 32 States in Mexico
during the period 1999-2002, the analysis of the link between total fiscal transfers
(both in case of Participaciones and Aportaciones) and SDP, both in per capita
terms, revealed that that there is a positive functional relationship between the
variables. The fiscal transfers are therefore not equalising. The policy implication34
                                                                                                                                 
of these econometric results is that Mexico may design fiscal transfers to take
into account of horizontal fiscal equalisation principles, as of in Canadian system
of fiscal transfers, to bridge the horizontal fiscal imbalances and in turn achieve
desired degree of fiscal equality across Mexican states.
16 Yet another social security scheme, which provides care to government
workers, is Institute of Health and Social Security for State Workers (ISSSTE). In
addition to IMSS and ISSSTE, PEMEX provides social security for oil company
workers, SEDENA to the members of the army and air force, and MARINA to the
navy. Social Security schemes covered approximately 51 percent of population
(OECD Health Technical Paper, 2004).
17 Health services for this population are provided directly through governmental
health facilities or indirectly through the IMSS-Solidaridad, which is a programme
financed by the government and actually delivered by the Social Security Institute
(IMSS). The health component of the poverty alleviation programmes run by the
government is also included. Mexico has a decentralised health system and
therefore states are responsible for public provision of care.
18 The working groups created within the Department of Health reviewed the
entire programme structure of health sector and made initial recommendations in
integrating gender into the policy framework. But the inexperience of the new
administration and lack of time led the programme and budget officers to be
confined to the existing formats of budgeting. However, gender budgeting
initiatives developed different approaches to reach out to government
departments, committees in congress, parts of national machinery, media and
civil society organisations. Training and sensitisation workshops also played an
important role in sensitising the public on inclusion of gender in budgeting in
Mexico at national and subnational levels.
19 The discussions in this section are drawn from the meetings with Ministry of
Finance, Oaxaca and Cos, Montiel (2004).